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AMENDED BLD-086     NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2466 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN G. CONKLIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KRISTINE M. ANTHOU, individually, and in her official capacity as an officer of the 
Court, and as agent for, and/or as representative of JPMorgan Chase, and EMC Mortgage 
Corporation; MARY D. GRENEN, individually, and in her official capacity as an officer 
of the Court, and as agent for and/or representative of EMC Mortgage Corporation; 
LAWRENCE T. HIMES, JR., individually, and in his official capacity as an officer of 
the Court, and, as agent for, and/or as representative of Green & Birsic, P.C.; GRENEN 
& BIRSIC, P.C., as counsel for JP Morgan Chase and EMC Mortgage Corporation; JP 
MORGAN CHASE, and/or; EMC MORTGAGE CORPPORATION; STEPHEN P. 
LINEBAUGH, individually and in his official capacity as Judge for the Court of 
Common Pleas of York County; RICHARD K. RENN, individually and in his official 
capacity as President Judge for the Court of Common Pleas of York County; MARIA 
MUSTI COOK, individually and in her official capacity as Judge for the Court of 
Common Pleas of York County; J. ROBERT CHUK, individually and in his official 
capacity as Court Administrator of the Court of Common Pleas of York County; YORK 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; RICHARD P. KEUERLEBER, individually and in his 
official capacity as Sheriff of York County; JOHN DOE, individually and in his official 
capacity as Deputy Sheriff of York County; COUNTY OF YORK; NINETEENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-02501) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
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Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Jurisdictional Dismissal or  
      Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 12, 2012 
       Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
   
 
(Opinion filed  January 20, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stephen G. Conklin appeals from several orders of the District Court, including 
one denying reconsideration of an order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.  
For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s denial of the 
preliminary injunction and dismiss the remainder of Conklin‟s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
I. 
 Conklin filed a 91-page complaint against JP Morgan Chase and EMC Mortgage 
Corporation; the law firm and lawyers that represent them; three judges of the York 
County Court of Common Pleas and the court administrator; the Nineteenth Judicial 
District of Pennsylvania; York County; the York County Sheriff; and a John Doe Deputy 
Sheriff.  He claimed that the defendants violated his civil rights, engaged in a conspiracy 
to deprive him of his property and his right to be heard in court, and violated several state 
laws in connection with allegedly fraudulent mortgage documents, an “illegal” 
foreclosure on and sale of his home after years of state court litigation, and ongoing 
ejectment proceedings filed against him in state court.    
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 On April 5, 2011, Conklin filed a motion for a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) and preliminary injunctive relief motivated by a March 21 default judgment 
entered against him in the ejectment action and a related writ of execution pursuant to 
which Conklin and his father were scheduled for eviction on April 7, 2011.  Conklin 
asked the District Court to enjoin or restrain the defendants from evicting him and his 
father and to enjoin all pending state court proceedings concerning his property.  On the 
same day, Judge Kane, who was assigned to the case, entered an order striking four 
paragraphs of the complaint and a motion for recusal that Conklin had filed, see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(f), and a second order recusing herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  The 
matter was immediately reassigned to Judge Rambo.   
 The Magistrate Judge assigned to the case issued a report and recommendation 
(“R&R”) advising the District Court to deny Conklin‟s motion for injunctive relief.  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded, among other things, that Conklin failed to establish a 
likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.  The District Court adopted the R&R, 
but the state court granted Conklin a TRO and he and his father were not evicted at that 
time.   
 Conklin filed two motions for reconsideration of Judge Kane‟s orders1 and a 
motion for reconsideration of his request for preliminary injunctive relief, all of which 
were denied.  Conklin timely appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the 
order denying him a TRO and preliminary injunction.  He also sought review of the order 
                                              
1
 Conklin did not “wish to change the result of Judge Kane‟s order of recusal,” but 
challenged the reasoning behind that order. 
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striking four paragraphs from his complaint and his recusal motion, and Judge Kane‟s 
recusal order.
2
   
II. 
 To the extent Conklin‟s claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343.  This Court has 
jurisdiction to address the District Court‟s denial of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),
3
 and may summarily affirm if no substantial question is 
presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  “We generally 
review a district court‟s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but 
review the underlying factual findings for clear error and examine legal conclusions de 
novo.”  Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted).  
                                              
2
 After this appeal was filed, the case was reassigned to a new district judge and the 
eviction was rescheduled, prompting Conklin to file additional motions for injunctive 
relief.  The District Court granted Conklin two TROs pending its consideration of 
whether a preliminary injunction was warranted, but ultimately denied preliminary 
injunctive relief on January 17, one day before the second TRO was set to expire.  As the 
eviction has since been rescheduled for January 23, Conklin filed an emergency motion 
with this Court seeking a TRO to prevent his anticipated eviction. 
3
 In contrast, we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s denial of a TRO.  See 
Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1997).  We also lack 
jurisdiction to review the order striking four paragraphs of Conklin‟s complaint and his 
recusal motion, as that order is interlocutory and not appealable at this time.  See 
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 604-05 (2009) (“A final decisio[n] is 
typically one by which a district court disassociates itself from a case.”) (quotations 
omitted and alteration in original); Gov‟t of V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 
2004) (explaining requirements of collateral order doctrine).  Furthermore, Conklin lacks 
standing to challenge Judge Kane‟s recusal order.  See Concerned Citizens of Cohocton 
Valley, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep‟t of Envtl. Conservation, 127 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[I]f a court grants the ultimate relief a party requested, even though on grounds other 
than those urged by the prevailing party, that party is generally not „aggrieved‟ by the 
judgment and may not appeal.”). 
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“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the 
merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that 
granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; 
and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 
F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 We agree with the District Court that Conklin failed to establish a likelihood of 
success on his claims to justify a preliminary injunction.  First, to the extent that Conklin 
seeks redress for injuries caused by the state courts‟ judgments, including the judgment 
against him in the foreclosure action and related sale of his property pursuant to that 
judgment, the District Court correctly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 
his claims.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 
165-66 (3d Cir. 2010).  To the extent Conklin seeks relief for injuries independent of, 
albeit related to, the state court proceedings, we agree with the District Court that many 
of his claims – such as those questioning the veracity of the mortgage documents – are 
likely barred by res judicata.
4
  See Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 
(Pa. 1995) (a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes future litigation between the 
parties or their privies on the same cause of action, including claims that could have been 
litigated during the first proceeding); see also Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of 
                                              
4
 Likewise, res judicata concerns are raised by an unsuccessful federal action that Conklin 
brought against some of the defendants in this case, in which he asserted federal and state 
claims stemming from the foreclosure proceedings on his home.  See Conklin v. Purcell, 
Krug & Haller, 282 F. App‟x 193 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A federal court looks to the law of the 
adjudicating state to determine its preclusive effect.”). 
 There are additional problems with Conklin‟s claims that make his success on the 
merits unlikely.  The crux of his complaint is that the banks, their lawyers, and the state 
judges presiding over proceedings relating to his property engaged in a vast conspiracy to 
deprive him of his property without due process.  However, nothing in the complaint 
suggests that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by racial or class-based 
discriminatory animus such that he could prevail on a § 1985 claim.  See Lake v. Arnold, 
112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997).  Furthermore, contrary to Conklin‟s apparent belief, 
“merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make 
a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”  See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 
24, 28 (1980).  Conklin therefore is also unlikely to prevail on his § 1983 claims against 
JP Morgan Chase, EMC Mortgage, and their attorneys, as those defendants cannot likely 
be considered state actors.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 More fundamentally, we find it difficult to see how Conklin was deprived of due 
process when he was given an opportunity to defend against the foreclosure and 
ejectment actions, appeared at several hearings, and filed numerous motions in state 
court, including stay motions that were granted and a motion to vacate the default 
judgment entered against him in the ejectment action.  That Conklin was ultimately 
unsuccessful, or disagrees with the manner in which the state judges handled or continue 
to handle his cases, does not amount to a due process claim.  See Miller v. City of Phila., 
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174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotations 
omitted).  In sum, having thoroughly reviewed the complaint and Conklin‟s filings, we 
find it unlikely that he will be entitled to a judgment in his favor. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s denial of 
Conklin‟s motion for a preliminary injunction.  For the same reasons, we deny Conklin‟s 
emergency motion for a temporary restraining order.  See Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1991).  We will dismiss the 
remainder of Conklin‟s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
